Table of contents
Foreword
1. Introduction
2. Background
2.1 UNEP's role in post-conflict environmental assessment
2.2 Depleted uranium
2.3 Assessing the risks
3. UNEP mission to Kosovo
3.1 Mission objectives
3.2 Composition of the team
3.3 Selection of sites
3.4 Fieldwork, sampling and laboratory analysis
4. Findings
5. Conclusions
6. Recommendations
7. Site-by-site findings
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Gjakove/Djakovica garrison
7.3 Vranoc/Vranovac
7.4 Radoniq/Radonjic
7.5 Irzniq/Rznic barracks
7.6 Bandera and Pozhare/Pozar
7.7 Rikavac
7.8 Ceja mountain
7.9 Planeje/Planeja village
7.10 Bellobrade/Belobrod
7.11 Kuke/Kukovce
7.12 Buzesh/Buzec
Foreword
This report presents the findings of the first-ever international assessment of the environmental impact of depleted uranium (DU) when used in a real conflict situation. It has been carried out as part of the post-conflict assessments conducted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Balkans.
The report builds on an earlier theoretical study by UNEP. In October 1999, as part of its assessment of the Kosovo conflict's impact on the environment and human settlements, UNEP carried out a Desk Assessment study of the potential effects of the possible use of DU during the conflict. The study was limited by the lack of information on the actual use of DU. In July 2000, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided UNEP with the information required, enabling a field mission to be planned and conducted. The information included a map indicating the location of 112 separate strikes by DU ammunition, and a table showing the number of DU rounds used and the coordinates of the targeted areas.
During the field mission to Kosovo, from 5 - 19 November 2000, soil, water and other samples were collected from eleven sites where DU had reportedly been used during the conflict. Five separate laboratories then analysed the samples.
When the laboratory phase was finalised in early March, the analyses of the samples collected showed only low levels of radioactivity. Furthermore, the results suggested that there is no immediate cause for concern regarding toxicity. However, major scientific uncertainties persist over the long-term environmental impacts of DU, especially regarding groundwater.
Due to these scientific uncertainties, UNEP calls for precaution. There is a very clear need for action to be undertaken on the clean-up and decontamination of the polluted sites, for awareness-raising aimed at the local population, and for future monitoring.
Just as the Desk Assessment conducted in October 1999 advised precaution, the recommendations of this report have also been guided by this approach, with the objective of protecting the environment and human health.
This difficult task was conducted effectively and efficiently thanks to the close cooperation of several key partners, to whom I am very grateful. NATO provided information and excellent cooperation. The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) assured the basic safety and security of mission staff, and provided other important logistical support. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) contributed expertise to the team and assisted with field logistics. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been our partner in the initial desk assessment and the field mission, and has assisted with the laboratory analysis. The WHO is conducting a parallel desk assessment on the health impacts, and the two reports together should provide comprehensive information on the issues surronding DU. Several governments, including those of Finland, Italy and the USA, have provided in-kind contributions, and I am especially grateful to the Government of Switzerland, which has provided generous financial support for this assessment.
Above all, my gratitude goes to the team of dedicated experts that conducted this historic mission, under the able and professional leadership of Pekka Haavisto. The team undertook demanding scientific field investigations at short notice to be sure of completing the work before the onset of winter in Kosovo. The laboratory work was conducted at an astonishing pace so that results could be made available in record time to a public concerned about the potential risks of DU.
Throughout the exercise, special efforts have been made to ensure the objectivity and scientific credibility of the analysis, by drawing on an international team of experts and by using a range of different laboratories for the sample analysis. It is hoped that the data we have collected in the field will advance further analysis of this topic in related fields, such as the impacts of DU on human health.
UNEP now recommends, following its precautionary approach and to reduce uncertainties about the environmental impacts of DU in the longer term, that ways and means be explored for undertaking similar missions in other Balkan regions where DU was used in earlier conflicts.
Klaus Töpfer United Nations Under-Secretary General Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme
1. Introduction
"Perhaps the most endangered natural resource in times of war is truth", stated the introduction of the joint UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force (BTF) report published in October 1999. For the safety of the local population and international workers in post-conflict situations it is essential to obtain truthful and correct information regarding the environmental situation and any possible connected health risks.
Depleted uranium (DU) was one the issues that confronted us during the environmental assessment work in the summer of 1999. As part of the BTF process, a special international group of experts - the 'Depleted Uranium Desk Assessment Group' - was established to assess the potential effects on human health and the environment arising from the possible use of DU. At the time the Group conducted its assessment, information on the use of depleted uranium during the Kosovo conflict was not available to the UN. The Group did, however, conduct a field mission in August 1999, during which it visited areas in and around the towns of Pristina, Klina and Pec that might have been struck by DU ordnance. The field mission did not find any evidence or indication of depleted uranium at the locations visited. In preparing precautionary recommendations, the Group concluded that it would not be meaningful to conduct further field searches for possible DU contamination without confirmation that DU had indeed been used in Kosovo and without data on the corresponding targeted areas.
Following a request made to NATO by the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan, in October 1999, NATO confirmed in February 2000 the use of DU during the Kosovo conflict and provided the UN with information consisting of a general map indicating the areas targeted and the total number of DU rounds fired. This information was not considered sufficient to justify a further field mission because of the absence of detailed site coordinates.
A request for additional information was made to NATO by the UN Secretary General. In July 2000, NATO provided the UN with a detailed map indicating sites where DU munitions had been used. This was accompanied by a table of coordinates for each of 112 attacks during which DU ammunition had been used, together with the number of rounds used in each case, where this latter information was known.
This additional information was reviewed at a meeting convened by UNEP in Geneva in September 2000. The meeting was attended by members of the Depleted Uranium Desk Assessment Group, by representatives of NATO, as well as by the UN partners concerned with the issue: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Medical Service in Geneva, and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The meeting recommended that UNEP, in close cooperation with relevant UN partner agencies and other interested parties, conduct a field study on sites in Kosovo that were struck by DU ordnance, as early as possible, preferably in autumn of that year.
A field mission was carried out from 5 - 19 November 2000, by a team composed of 14 experts from inter-governmental agencies, well-known institutions, and other interested parties. Additional cooperation was received from NATO, KFOR and UNMIK. During the mission, soil, water and other samples were collected and sent for analysis to five laboratories well reputed in matters of radiological or toxicological analysis. The use of several laboratories allowed comparison of different methods for assessing impacts. Each laboratory was responsible for its own methodology and results.
UNEP alone, however, had responsibility for the selection of sites for sampling. UNEP chose sites that were most heavily targeted, as well as sites that were in or closest to inhabited areas. In selecting the sites, variation was also sought in the surrounding natural environment, soil types and biodiversity. Sampling in some areas was limited by the fact that the sites had not been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. Furthermore, the fact that the sampling was conducted one and a half years after the conflict presented a number of scientific challenges. Owing to better-than-expected weather conditions, however, eleven sites were visited rather than the initially planned number of six. Thus, sampling occurred at approximately 12% of the total number of DU-targeted sites listed by NATO, in two different KFOR sectors - the Italian sector MNB (W) and the German sector MNB (S).
Experience obtained in the field suggested that the site coordinates provided by NATO were accurate. Measurements taken during the August 1999 field mission - which had no information on the exact sites where DU had been used - did not detect any elevated levels of radiation. During the November 2000 field mission, no evidence was found of DU presence outside of the NATO-listed sites. UNEP field experience also supports the information provided by NATO on the type of DU ammunition used. There are no indications of the use of any other type of DU ammunition in Kosovo.
Nevertheless, even after one and a half years had elapsed since the conflict, the UNEP team found slightly radioactive material at many sites, including the penetrator and jacket parts of DU ammunition. On tarmac roads and areas covered with concrete that had been struck by DU ammunition, radioactivity was measurable in the immediate vicinity of the impact holes. The samples collected around the sites where DU ordnance had been used show that DU dust is also measurable near the targeted sites. Even if alarming environmental risks do not now exist at these sites, UNEP recommends several precautionary measures - among others, marking the DU sites and decontaminating them when possible. In the areas most at risk of groundwater contamination, we recommend the monitoring of the water quality..
Apart from concern over the possible impacts of DU on local populations and the field staff of international organisations, there has also been considerable concern over the possible impacts of DU on military personnel. Three specific situations should be taken into account. First, the additional risks - beyond the obvious ones - of being at or very close to the site of an area under attack by DU. Clearly this circumstance could not have been investigated within the scope of the UNEP mission, some 18 months after the conflict had ended. Secondly, during the clean-up of targeted sites, loose contamination might pose a risk, thereby requiring protective measures - especially when entering partly destroyed armoured vehicles. No such vehicles were present at the sites visited by UNEP in November 2000 and it is therefore likely that military clean-up had already taken place. UNEP has no information of the removal or possible current locations of any DU-damaged vehicles from the visited sites.
The third situation concerns mine clearance at sites where DU has been used. There are significant parts of Kosovo that have yet to be de-mined and cleared of unexploded ordnance, including areas that were targeted with DU. De-mining is sometimes carried out by exploding the mines, which could lead to increased exposure to DU fragments and dust.
However, there is a lack of information on the behaviour of DU (and related risks) in cases where penetrators are present in minefields being cleared by explosion.
The observations made at the sampling sites also provide the basis for extrapolation to other areas in Kosovo targeted by DU ordnance. Based on the findings of the report, a number of recommendations are made both for the areas where sampling occurred and for all sites in Kosovo where DU has been used.
DU is certainly not the main environmental problem in Kosovo at the moment. Nevertheless, it is an additional negative factor in the equation, and action should be taken to eliminate all possible risks to the environment. It is important that the military organisations, NATO and KFOR, continue to take part in the elimination of all DU-related risks, particularly as many of the DU sites remain at risk from mines and other unexploded ordnance.
UNEP also recommends that ways and means be explored for undertaking similar missions in other Balkan regions where DU has been used. The first steps should be a similar field studies at the few sites in Serbia and Montenegro struck by DU ordnance during the Kosovo conflict, to ensure that the findings in Kosovo are valid also in other parts of the region. Secondly, a broad-based environmental assessment, including the issue of DU, should be carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bearing in mind that a comprehensive post-conflict environmental assessment was never conducted following the war in the 1990s.
Conducting post-conflict environmental assessments differs from ordinary environmental assessment in that the security aspect overshadows the whole work, due to unexploded ordnance and other serious security risks. I am therefore most grateful to KFOR, and especially its Multinational Brigades, West and South, for their strong commitment to ensuring the protection of the members of the UNEP DU expert team during the mission.
UNEP wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of experts who participated in the field mission. At the conclusion of the mission, these experts, through their institutions, provided UNEP with the analyses of samples they had taken during the mission. The results of these analyses were used as a basis by UNEP to prepare the present report. However, the conclusions and recommendations reflect solely the views of UNEP.
While carrying out this exercise we have noted that there is a lack of information on the nature and effects of DU, as well as the associated risks. For this reason, I note with great pleasure that IAEA has announced that, together with relevant UN organisations such as WHO and UNEP, it will organise courses for scientific institutions, national and local authorities, international agencies and NGOs regarding the issue of depleted uranium.
The success of this scientific work is due to the commitment and expertise of colleagues both from the UN system, and from the academic world. I am most grateful for the outstanding efforts by the DU experts from Bristol University - Department for Earth Sciences, the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Italian Environmental Protection Agency (ANPA), the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI), the Swiss AC-Laboratorium Spiez, and the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM).
Pekka Haavisto Chairman, UNEP Depleted Uranium Assessment Team Geneva, 12 March 2001
2. Background
2.1 UNEP's role in post-conflict environmental assessment
In May 1999, the Joint UNEP/UNCHS (Habitat) 'Balkans Task Force' (BTF) was established with the aim of making an overall assessment of the consequences of the Kosovo conflict for the environment and human settlements, focusing in particular on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia). As part of this work, an international expert group on depleted uranium (DU), the 'Depleted Uranium Desk Assessment Group' was appointed to "assess the potential health and environmental impact of depleted uranium used in the Kosovo conflict". However, it should be noted that use of DU in Kosovo had not been officially confirmed at this time and no information was available on the locations of sites possibly targeted by DU. The work was carried out, inter alia by:
- collecting background information on the potential effects of depleted uranium on human health and/or the environment, the quantity and quality of depleted uranium used in the conflict, and the locations of affected sites;
- assessing, by means of a scenario-based desk study, the medium- and long-term potential health and environmental impacts of depleted uranium used in the Kosovo conflict;
- undertaking a fact-finding mission to Kosovo to make preparations for a possible future sampling campaign;
- analysing information in order to quantify problems 'on the ground' in potentially affected areas and to provide qualitative answers concerning the possible risks to human health and the environment.
The fact-finding mission did not encounter elevated levels of radiation, either in and around the wreckage of destroyed military vehicles, or on/alongside roads. Based on these preliminary measurements, the team concluded that there was no evidence or indication of the presence of DU at the locations visited. However, it was also stressed that any further investigations could only be meaningful if and when confirmation was received of whether DU ammunition had been used and, if so, where. This was deemed essential for making additional measurements, for verifying provisional risk assessments, and for assessing the necessity of remedial or precautionary actions. Further information is contained in the report 'The potentials effects on human health and the environment arising from possible use of depleted uranium during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. A preliminary assessment' (UNEP, 1999).
In July 2000, following approaches from the UN Secretary General, NATO made available a detailed list of sites where DU had been used. UNEP then moved quickly to assemble a team of international experts to prepare a scientific mission to Kosovo. The mission itself took place from 5 - 19 November 2000.
2.2 Depleted uranium
What is depleted uranium?
Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of the process used to enrich natural uranium ore for use in nuclear reactors and in nuclear weapons. It is distinguished from natural uranium by differing concentrations of certain uranium isotopes. Natural uranium has a uranium-235 (abbreviated as U-235 or 235 U) content of 0.7%, whereas the content of U-235 in DU is depleted to about one third of its original content (0.2 - 0.3%).
Like natural uranium, DU is an unstable, radioactive, heavy metal that emits ionizing alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Because of its radioactivity the amount of uranium in a given sample decreases continuously but the so-called half life (the period required for the amount of uranium to be reduced by 50%) is very long - 4.5 billion years in the case of the isotope uranium-238 (U-238 or 238 U). In practice, therefore, the level of radioactivity (which is measured in units per second known as 'becquerels' - Bq) does not change significantly over human lifetimes.
The UNEP studies in Kosovo showed that the material in the DU penetrators found there also contained traces of transuranic isotopes such as uranium-236 and plutonium-239/240 which are created during nuclear reactions. This indicates that at least part of the material in the penetrators had originated from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. However, the amounts of these isotopes were very low and not significant in terms of the overall radioactivity of penetrators.
The applications of DU and its use during the Kosovo conflict
DU has been used for civil and military purposes for many years. The civil applications include use in radiation shielding and aircraft ballast. Because of its high density (19.0 g/cm 3 ) and resistance, DU also has major military applications, particularly in defensive armouring for tanks and other vehicles. However, the properties of DU also make it ideal for offensive use in armour-piercing munitions. Both tanks and aircraft can fire depleted uranium munitions, with tanks firing larger calibre rounds (100 and 120 mm) and aircraft smaller calibre rounds (25 and 30 mm). During the Kosovo conflict, DU weapons were fired from NATO aircraft, and it has been reported that over 30,000 rounds of DU were used (UNEP, 2000).
Characteristics and behaviour of DU anti-armour rounds fired by A-10 aircraft
The type of DU round fired by NATO A-10 aircraft has a length of 173 mm and a diameter of 30 mm. Inside the round is a conical DU 'penetrator', 95 mm in length and with a diameter at the base of 16 mm. The weight of one penetrator is approximately 300 g. The penetrator is fixed in an aluminium 'jacket' (or 'casing') 60 mm long and 30 mm in width. When the penetrator hits an armoured vehicle, the penetrator continues through the armouring, but the jacket usually remains outside. The A-10 aircraft is equipped with one gattling gun capable of firing 3,900 rounds per minute. A typical burst of fire occurs for two to three seconds and involves 120 to 195 rounds. These hit the ground in a straight line, one to three metres apart, depending on the angle of the approach, and cover an area of about 500 m 2 . The number of penetrators hitting a target varies with the type of target, but does not normally exceed 10% of the rounds fired (CHPPM, 2000).
Penetrators that hit either non-armoured targets, or miss targets, will generally remain intact, passing through the target and/or becoming buried in the ground. The depth depends on the angle of the round, the speed of the plane, the type of target and the nature of the ground surface. In clay soils, penetrators used by the A-10 attack aircraft may reach more than two metres depth. Conversely, penetrators hitting hard objects such as rocks and stones may ricochet and be found lying on the surface some distance from the targeted area.
Normally 10-35% (maximum of 70%) of the round becomes aerosol on impact with armour and the DU dust catches fire (Rand, 1999). Most of the dust particles are < 5 µm in size, and spread according to wind direction. DU dust is black and a target that has been hit by DU ammunition can be recognised by the black dust cover in and around the target (U.S. AEPI, 1994). The DU dust formed during the penetration of armoured vehicles can be dispersed into the environment, contaminating the air and the ground. However, such contamination should be limited to within about 100 metres of the target (CHPPM, 2000). It is important to note that hits on non-armoured ('soft') targets do not generate significant contamination because the DU penetrators do not generate significant amounts of aerosols on impact.
Small penetrator fragments and DU dust are gradually transported into the upper soil layer by water, insects and worms. Wind, rainwater, or surface water flow may also redistribute the dust. Due to the varying chemical properties of different soils and rocks, the effects of buried penetrators on the environment will also vary. The mobilisation of DU in the soil profile and its possible contamination of groundwater will depend on a range of factors such as the chemistry and structure of the surrounding soil, rainfall and hydrology.
2.3 Assessing the risks
The concept of risk, its meaning and application are discussed in detail in Appendix I. The following is a summary, intended to equip readers with the necessary background for interpreting the findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in sections 4, 5 and 6 of this report.
'Risk' can either refer to the probability of occurrence of an event, or to the consequences of an event if it occurs. A third possibility is a combination of probability and consequence.
Irrespective of how the term is used, it is clear that scientific quantification of a given risk has to be expressed clearly and concisely, so that appropriate judgements and responses can be made.
The effects of being exposed to DU are both radiological (i.e. due to radiation) and chemical (i.e. as a result of biochemical effects in the human body). Corresponding health consequences may, depending upon the dose or intake, include cancer and malfunction of body organs, particularly the kidneys.
In order to avoid such consequences arising from day-to-day procedures in which radioactive and toxic materials are used, a range of applicable standards have been established. These include limits for exposure to radiation and toxic materials.
However, the existence of such limits and standards does not mean that at any point above these values there will automatically be severe adverse consequences such as serious illness. There are still wide safety margins built in before an unconditionally unacceptable threshold is reached.
One possible way of judging the consequences of events or circumstances where exposure to DU may have occurred is to compare findings, measurements or assessments with natural levels, and with given 'safety' limits or standards.
In this report the consequences are those that might be caused by intake of DU by ingestion or inhalation and by external exposure to radiation from DU.
The consequences of radiation may be expressed directly in terms of the radiation dose, which is measured in millisieverts (mSv) or microsieverts (µSv). Comparisons can be made with natural levels and with established limits and action levels.
With regard to chemical toxicity, the consequences are expressed in concentration or total intake and compared with given health standards.
In this way it should be possible to express the risk (consequence) as 'insignificant' or 'significant' bearing in mind the basis for the comparisons drawn. In this report, the consequences of radiation are considered insignificant for doses less than 1 mSv per year (or per infrequent event) and significant for doses higher than 1 mSv. In relation to chemical toxicity, consequences are treated as insignificant for concentrations or total intakes below applicable health standards, and significant for those above health standards.
In the discussions of site-by-site results in section 7, judgements of risk are made on the basis of DU ground contamination measured. The relation between measurement results and risks are discussed in Appendix I. There is also a summary of risk assessments in relation to a given situation (known as the Reference Case and taken from the report of the 1999 UNEP DU Desk Assessment). This assumes ground surface contamination of 10 g DU/m 2 . Some means of exposure lead to significant risks (consequences), others to insignificant risks. If the ground contamination is less than 0.1 - 1 g/m 2 the consequences are normally all insignificant.
In the present report, the risks considered and assessed - in terms of significance or insignificance of consequences for the environment and human health - are the following:
- If there is widespread measurable contamination of the ground surface by DU, there is a risk that some DU will become airborne through wind action and be subsequently inhaled by people. There is also a risk of contamination of food (fruit, vegetables, meat etc.) and drinking water.
- If there are localised points of concentrated contamination (referred to in this report as 'contamination points'), there is a risk of contamination of hands and/or of direct ingestion of contaminated soil. There is also a risk of possible airborne contamination and contamination of drinking water.
- Solid pieces of DU lying on the ground surface - either complete penetrators, or fragments of them - can be picked up by someone completely unaware that they are handling uranium. Consequently, there is a risk of being exposed to external beta radiation and to internal radiation (i.e. from inside the body) if dust or fragments of DU enter the body.
- A large percentage of DU rounds that either hit soft targets, or missed the target completely, will have penetrated into the ground where they will corrode (to a widely varying degree, depending on site-specific environmental conditions) over time. As a result, there is a risk of future contamination of groundwater and nearby wells used to supply drinking water. There is also a risk that fragments of DU will be brought up to the surface during reconstruction of houses, roads etc.
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Appendices (in pdf* format)